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I.

INTRODUCTION

A flight lands on the runway at Pittsburgh International Airport. A part
of the plane near the stairs malfunctions and the exit stairs become wet.
Imagine that while exiting the plane, a passenger slips and falls off the top
step suffering severe injuries. This hypothetical creates an interesting dichotomy; on the one hand, the plane is not in an operational state where
there is a concern for air safety and the malfunctioning part plays little to no
role in air safety. However, the stairs and everything included is either
compliant with the standards set forth by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or the design of the aircraft (including the stairs) is thoroughly
reviewed by the FAA and given an “air worthiness certificate.” Using the
traditional theory of negligence, the plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) a
duty owed to him or her by the airline to not have wet stairs, (2) they
breached that duty by having wet stairs, (3) the breach actually and proximately caused her injuries, and (4) damages. However, according to the
Third Circuit, the claim brought by the passenger pursuant to state law may
be preempted because the part of the plane that malfunctioned is included
within the meaning of air safety.1 In other words, because plaintiff’s claim
for negligence is preempted by the Federal Aviation Act, he must set forth a
claim for negligence alleging defendant violated a specific federal standard
of care (i.e. duty element), which is promulgated by the FAA. Conversely,
that same decision allows the injured plaintiff to still argue that state standards of care are not preempted because the plane was not “operated for the
purposes of air navigation” and therefore does not concern air safety.2 The
analysis undertaken by the Third Circuit and the different interpretation
given by other circuits represents a need for a better approach to preemption
in the context of aviation law.

1.
2.

Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 126-27 (3d Cir. 2010).
Id.
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For over sixty years, Congress has played a substantial role in the field
of aviation safety.3 As a result of military and civilian aircraft collisions,4
Congress enacted the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (“Aviation Act”),5
which was designed to create a system of unified rules to promote safety
and efficiency in the field of aviation.6 Subsequently, Congress amended
the Aviation Act with the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
(ADA),7 which removed government control over fares, routes, and market
entry of new aircraft, thereby allowing private companies control over some
aspects of aviation.8 Congress again amended the Aviation Act when it
passed The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA),9 which
provided an eighteen-year statute of repose for law suits against manufacturers of general aviation aircraft and component parts.10 Because the
FAA—a regulatory group within the Transportation Department—
continually publishes new regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations,
aviation law remains a heavily regulated field of law.11 Despite over forty
years of case law, there remains ambiguity regarding whether Congress—in
enacting the Aviation Act and subsequent amendments—intended to
preempt state standards of care in the context of negligence and product
liability claims.12 The Supreme Court has decided several issues discussing
the effect of the Aviation Act, but has failed to address the question of
whether state standards of care apply to negligence and product liability
claims.13 As a result, there is little unanimity between the lower federal
courts and even where these courts come to the same conclusion, they often
3. See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-276, 72 Stat. 731 (1958).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Christensen, 419 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1969); see
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-276, 72 Stat. 731 (1958).
5. Federal Aviation Act, 72 Stat. 731.
6. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 639 (1973)
(noting that “a uniform and exclusive system of federal regulation [is required] if the congressional objectives underlying the [FAA] are to be fulfilled.”); see also H.R. Rep. No.
2360, reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3741, 3741 (stating that the purpose of the act was to
provide the agency with full authority and responsibility of the advancement and promulgation of civil aeronautics, including the rule making and enforcement of safety regulations);
see generally Federal Aviation Act, 72 Stat. 731.
7. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705.
8. Id. § 105.
9. General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat.
1552 (1993).
10. Id. § 2.
11. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 91 (2010).
12. See John D. McClune, There is No Complete, Implied, or Field Preemption of
State Law Personal Injury/Wrongful Death Negligence or Product Liability Claims in General Aviation Cases, 71 J. AIR L. & COM. 717, 719 (2006).
13. See generally City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624
(1973); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374 (1992); Am. Airlines v. Wolens, 513
U.S. 219 (1995).
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use markedly different analyses.14 Thus, the recent abrogated preemption
ruling by the Third Circuit in Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc.,15 and the
Supreme Court preemption decision of Wyeth v. Levine, presents both a
novel case to illustrate a lack of cohesion among courts and to illustrate the
current state of the law dealing with preemption in the aviation context.16
The Third Circuit’s decision in Elassaad held that state standards of
care are preempted when a plane is in “operations for the purpose of air
navigation.”17 Though this decision is less broad than its predecessor and
closer to how some other courts interpret the issue, the ruling creates distinct problems. In theory, a plaintiff can bring a claim for negligence based
on state standards of care as long as the alleged harm occurred when a plane
was not in “operations for the purposes of air navigation,” and when no
specific federal regulation is implicated.18 Whereas prior to the recently
vacated ruling, a plaintiff in the Third Circuit had to allege a deviation from
federal standards and show recklessness, regardless of whether the alleged
negligence occurred in the context of the flight or while the plane was stationary, because the entire field of “aviation safety” was impliedly
preempted.19
Plaintiffs now have a new window with which to bring claims against
an airline, but this window is limited, broad, and undefined all at once. It
fails to delineate with much specificity when an airplane or regulation is in
“operations for the purpose of air navigation”20 and, due to recent preemption analysis from the Supreme Court, the entire field of air safety may not
actually be preempted.21 The Elassaad decision arguably allows state
standards of care to apply in some situations, but not in other circumstances, some of which are significantly similar, other than when the plane is in
14. See generally Abdullah v. Am. Airlines Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 365 (3d Cir. 1999);
Monroe v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 417 F. Supp. 2d 824, 835 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (finding no
preemption in field of aviation safety); Lucia v. Teledyne Cont’l Motors, 173 F. Supp. 2d
1253, 1270 (S.D. Ala. 2001) (stating that Congress or the FAA did not intend to fully occupy
the field, such that no state remedies could apply in areas not affecting such rates, routes, or
services). Compare Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 475 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding
failure to warn of deep vein thembrosis is preempted, but leaving open the question of
whether unsafe seat configurations were preempt), with Martin v. Midwest Express Holdings, 555 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no preemption in defective design of stairs
and limiting preemption to areas of aviation where regulations are perverse).
15. Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 119 (3d Cir. 2010).
16. See id.
17. Id. at 126.
18. Id.
19. See Abdullah v. Am. Airlines Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 367 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[F]ederal
law establish[ed] the applicable standards of care in the field of air safety, generally, thus
preempting the entire field from state and territorial regulation.”).
20. See Elassaad, 613 F.3d at 126.
21. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195 (2009).
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flight.22 The overbroad, definitional approach to field preemption employed
by the Third Circuit may completely frustrate congressional intent or misinterpret the role and purpose of the Aviation Act. It will take further decisions from the Third Circuit, lower courts, other circuits to bring a semblance of continuity with respect to clearly defining when in fact a plane is
in “operations for the purposes of air navigation.”23
This Note begins by giving a brief history of congressional legislation
in aviation law and preemption. Next, the Note discusses in greater depth
the relevant case law that interprets the Aviation Act and analysis of Supreme Court precedent dealing with preemption, with a specific application
of aviation law to the recent Supreme Court decision Wyeth v. Levine. The
focus then switches exclusively to the past precedent, Abdullah v. American
Airlines,24 in order to put the Wyeth decision in context. In the next section,
the current precedent, Elassaad, is discussed, including a detailed review of
the procedural and substantive facts. In the analysis section, this Note discusses the potential implications, flaws, and problems of the decisions in
Elassaad and Abdullah by comparing these decisions to decisions from
other courts, similar areas of law, recent Supreme Court preemption analysis, and some public policy considerations. This Note concludes by giving
arguments for and against preemption, but ultimately concludes that a middle ground approach or claim-by-claim basis is the proper analytical
framework for deciding issues of preemption in the aviation context until
there is a ruling by the Supreme Court signaling whether an all or nothing
approach is proper.
II.
A.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

FEDERAL AVIATION ACT AND AMENDMENTS

Beginning in 1938, the Civil Aeronautics Board regulated all of the interstate airline industry.25 Desiring a more comprehensive scheme, Congress passed the Aviation Act,26 which was intended to “promote safety in
aviation and thereby protect the lives of persons who travel on board aircraft[s].”27 The FAA, under the Department of Transportation (DOT), continues to publish comprehensive regulations dealing with all aspects of
22. See Elassaad, 613 F.3d at 126.
23. See id.
24. Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 337.
25. McClune, supra note 12, at 719.
26. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-276, 72 Stat. 731.
27. Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 368 (citing In re Mex. City Aircrash of October 31, 1979,
708 F.2d 400, 406 (9th Cir. 1983)); see generally A Brief History of the Federal Aviation
Act, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., http://www.faa.gov/about/history (Feb. 1, 2010, 6:06 PM).
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aviation.28 It is the pervasiveness of these regulations that has led some
courts, such as the Third Circuit, to conclude that a significant portion of
aviation law is impliedly preempted.29 Among the plethora of regulations,
the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) codified in the Code of Federal
Regulations specifically regulates pilot certification,30 pilot pre-flight duties,31 pilot flight responsibilities,32 flight rules,33 minimum standards for air
worthiness (specific components of the airplane),34 and when the seat belt
sign should be illuminated.35 These FAR are so pervasive that they police
matters ranging from the time a pilot must wait after consuming alcohol
before acting as pilot-in-command,36 to the recommended ground loading
on ski-equipped bushplanes,37 all of which are codified in the Code of Federal Regulations.38 It also generally regulates the standard for operating an
aircraft, providing that “[n]o person may operate an aircraft in a careless or
reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another.”39
Despite the pervasive regulation and sovereignty clause, Congress included a savings clause within the Aviation Act40 stating: “Nothing . . . in
this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at
common law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition
to such remedies.”41 Courts that find a lack of preemptive effect believe the
savings clause was intended to allow states to pass standards in addition to
federal standards.42 This argument is further bolstered by the passage of the

28. See 14 C.F.R. § 91 (2010). The Code of Federal Regulations has both specific
and general regulations regarding aviation. See id.
29. See Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 126-27 (3d Cir. 2010).
30. 14 C.F.R. § 61.3 (2010) (“No person may act as pilot in command . . . without a
current pilot certificate in his possession . . . .”).
31. Id. § 91.7 (ensuring that pilots verify aircraft’s worthiness); 14 C.F.R. § 91.107
(2010) (ensuring passengers are briefed on the use of their seat belts).
32. 14 C.F.R. § 91.7 (forcing pilot to discontinue flight when any mechanical problem arises).
33. Id. § 91.101 (governing the operation of aircraft within the United States and
within twelve nautical miles from the coast of the United States).
34. Id. § 25.810.
35. Id. § 121.317.
36. 14 C.F.R. § 91.17 (2010).
37. 14 C.F.R. § 23.505 (2010).
38. Sean S. Kelly, Federalism in Flight: Preemption Doctrine and Air Crash Litigation, 28 TRANSP. L.J. 107, 115 (2000).
39. 14 C.F.R. § 91.13. Note that this provision is often cited by airline companies in
cases where passengers are injured in-flight. See, e.g., Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d
464, 472 (9th Cir. 2007).
40. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-276, 72 Stat. 731.
41. Am. Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 222 (1995) (citing Federal Aviation Act
of 1958 § 1106).
42. See McClune, supra note 12, at 719.
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Airline Deregulation Act (ADA),43 which provided an express preemption
clause that prohibits states from enforcing any law “relating to rates, routes,
or services” of any air carrier,44 but maintains the original savings clause of
the Aviation Act.45 However, the legislative history of the ADA also suggests that Congress was primarily concerned with creating more freedom
for private companies to experiment with new routes, reducing red tape,46
and allowing “‘competitive market forces to determine the quality, variety
and prices of air services.’”47 Thus, it is difficult to infer congressional intent to not preempt other areas of aviation law because nothing in the legislative history demonstrates a concern or awareness of the savings clause or
a problem with how courts interpret preemption outside of rates, routes, and
services.48
Congress again amended the Aviation Act with the passage of the
GARA.49 The GARA provides an eighteen-year statute of repose for general aviation aircraft and aircraft components, which preempts suits dealing
with defects in design and manufacturing after eighteen years of the aircrafts delivery from the manufacturer.50 Congress narrowly defined “general aviation aircraft” as an aircraft with a maximum passenger load of less
than twenty passengers that, at the time of an accident, was not operating
“in scheduled passenger-carrying operations . . . .”51 The GARA’s preemption provision states that “[federal law] supersedes any State law to the extent that such law permits a civil action described in [the statute of repose]
section . . . .”52 Indeed, proponents of no preemptive effect find that the
continued existence of the savings clause and no express preemption clause,
despite two opportunities for Congress to amend the Federal Aviation Act,
suggests that Congress did not originally intend to preempt state standards
43. 49 U.S.C. § 1305 (1978).
44. Id. § 1305; Morales v. Trans World Airlines Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378-79 (1992).
45. Margolis v. United Airlines, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 318, 320 (E.D. Mich. 1993)
(stating that Congress retained the savings clause that preserved common law and statutory
remedies).
46. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1211, at 2-3, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3737, 3738-39.
47. Margolis, 811 F. Supp. at 320 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-1779, 53 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3737).
48. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1211, at 2-3, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3737, 3742.
49. General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat.
1552. For a general discussion of the General Aviation Revitalization Act and its preemption
clause, see Scott David Smith, The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994: The Initial
Necessity for, Out-Right Success of, and Continued Need for the Act to Maintain American
General Aviation Predominance Throughout the World, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 75
(2009).
50. General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub L. No. 103-298, § 3, 108 Stat.
1552, 1553 (1994).
51. Id. § 2.
52. Id.
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of care and narrowly defined the situations where preemption would occur.53 In theory, a statute of repose would not be necessary if those claims
were already preempted. However, both the ADA and the GARA preempt
very narrow areas of law, leaving the courts to discern whether the Aviation
Act has general preemptive effect.54
B.

WHAT IS PREEMPTION AND HOW DOES IT FIT INTO AVIATION LAW?

The foundation for preemption is in the Supremacy Clause55 of Article
VI of the U.S. Constitution.56 It states that the laws of the United States
“shall be the supreme law of the land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.”57 Thus, state law must
yield to constitutionally valid federal law whenever a conflict between the
two arises.58 There are two ways Congress may indicate preemptive intent:
“through a statute’s express language or through its structure and purpose.”59 Thus, courts have concluded that state laws are invalid under express or implied preemption.60 Express preemption occurs when Congress
deliberately articulates—through the statute in question—that it expressly
prohibits enforcement of any state law within the scope of the express
preemption provision.61
Preemption can also be implied, when the statute lacks express language, through either conflict or field preemption.62 Conflict preemption
occurs when it is impossible to comply with both federal law and state law
or where state law stands as an obstacle to the desired results of Congress.63
Field preemption arises when Congress occupies an entire field of a substantive area of law, which precludes any type of state interference within
that field.64 However, despite the title, field preemption can be very nar53. See Monroe v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 417 F. Supp. 2d 824, 830 (E.D. Tex. 2006)
(stating that the adoption of the GARA implied a continued viability of state tort law
claims); see also Pub. Health Trust of Dade Cnty. v. Lake Aircraft Inc., 992 F.2d 291, 295
(11th Cir. 1993).
54. Kelly, supra note 38, at 115.
55. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conserv. & Dev. Comm’n., 461 U.S.
190, 204 (1983).
59. Altria Grp. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 70 (2008).
60. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1993).
61. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990). Note that the reach of the
express preemption clause is another question the court must decide. See Abdullah v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 367 (3d Cir. 1999).
62. Mass. Ass'n of HMOs v. Ruthardt, 194 F.3d 176, 179 (1st Cir. 1999).
63. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
64. Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 367.
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row.65 Congress does not expressly state its intent to occupy the entire field.
But due to the pervasiveness of federal control or as a result of the practical
implications of state regulations, in addition to those that are federal, on the
intended national scheme—these state regulations or standards are
preempted by federal law.66
1.

Supreme Court Precedent in Aviation Context: A Limited Framework

The Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed whether state law is
preempted in the context of negligence or product liability cases in the field
of aviation.67 The Supreme Court first discussed preemption in the context
of aviation law in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota.68 However, before
the passage of the Aviation Act, Justice Jackson did allude to implied federal preemption in the field of aviation due to the “intensive and exclusive”
federal control over the scheme of flight operations.69
Because the Supreme Court has never addressed negligence claims in
the context of aviation law, the Court offers minimal guidance to lower
courts in analyzing congressional intent under those claims.70 However, the
history of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of preemption in the area of
aviation does offer a limited framework.71 In City of Burbank v. Lockheed
Air Terminal,72 the Court issued a landmark decision that laid the foundation for preemption analysis in aviation law, albeit before the addition of
the ADA and the GARA.73 Citing the “pervasive nature” of the scheme of
federal regulation of aircraft noise, City of Burbank provided a comfortable
context for the Court to find field preemption.74 In City of Burbank, a city
ordinance barred flights between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. due
65. Id. (noting that the scope of field preemption can be “narrowly defined”).
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Am. Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 219 (1995); City of Burbank v.
Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 624 (1973); Morales v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 374 (1992).
68. Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (Jackson, J. concurring).
69. Id. at 303. It should be noted that the heart of the holding was a limitation on
state power to tax domiciled federal airplanes. Id. at 300-01.
70. See generally Am. Airlines, 513 U.S. 219 (noting that the Court has never approached the issue on the preemptive effect of the Code of Federal Regulations); Morales,
504 U.S. at 374; City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 624.
71. See, e.g., City Of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 633 (discussing the issue of aircraft
noise, the Supreme Court found preemption as a result of the pervasiveness of federal regulation).
72. Id.
73. See id. at 624.
74. See id. at 633. Note that the Court never stated it was field preemption, but the
language suggests they mean field preemption. See id.
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to noise levels.75 The regulation of time that flights could depart and arrive
due to noise levels conflicted with a combined departmental role (Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and FAA) under the Aviation Act.76 The
Court cited the Noise Control Act of 1972,77 which amended the Aviation
Act for the sole purpose of proposing regulations to provide control over
airplane noise.78 The amended section stated that “the FAA after consultation with the Secretary of Transportation and with [the] EPA, shall prescribe and amend standards for the measurement of aircraft noise and sonic
boom and shall prescribe and amend such regulations as the [Aviation Act]
may find necessary . . . .”79 In reaching its decision that states were
preempted from regulating flight times due to noise, the Supreme Court
discussed the pervasiveness of the Code of Federal Regulations dealing
with noise control.80 Treating the power to promulgate regulations as additional evidence of congressional intent, it created the framework that many
courts use today to determine whether Congress intended preemption under
the Aviation Act.81
City of Burbank provided an easier context for preemption than many
of the issues that courts face today because the legislative history provided
much richer evidence that Congress intended to preempt state and local
laws dealing with aircraft noise.82 Congress stated: “States and local governments are preempted from establishing or enforcing noise emissions
standards for aircraft unless such standards are identical to standards prescribed under this bill.”83 In essence, the Court reasoned that the cumulative
effect of each individual city having its own flight schedule would severely
debilitate the FAA’s ability to regulate flights.84 However, the dissent
pointed out that a finding of preemption was suspect because the Noise
Control Act gave the EPA a role in the FAA’s exclusive authority to reduce
noise through regulations and standards directed at multiple causes regarding the level of noise, but did not explicitly state that local governmental
bodies were prevented from dealing with the noise problem by an alterna75. City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 625-26.
76. See id. at 628-35.
77. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 40 U.S.C. § 611, amended by the Noise Control
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234.
78. City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 628-29.
79. Id. at 654 n.6 (quoting the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 40 U.S.C. § 611
(amended 1972)).
80. See id. at 630.
81. See, e.g., Witty v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 366 F.3d 380, 385-86 (5th Cir. 2004);
Pub. Health Trust of Dade Cnty. v. Lake Aircraft, Inc., 992 F.2d 291, 294 (11th Cir. 1993).
82. City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 635 (noting that the legislative history illustrated
an expanded role in aviation noise regulation that was already preempted by federal law).
83. H. REP. NO. 92-842, at 10 (1972).
84. City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 639.
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tive method.85 The conversation between the majority and dissent is characteristic of the controversy regarding field preemption in the aviation context—as an entirely judicial creation, there is significant room to second
guess a finding of implied field preemption when congressional intent is not
dispositive. Unlike run-of-the-mill negligence claims however, the Court
had at its disposal greater evidence of preemption; even so, the decision
was a single vote majority and expressly limited to the area of noise control.86 As the Third Circuit specifically relied on the “judicial interpretation”
of the Aviation Act in City of Burbank, the extended position of the Third
Circuit is not indefensible.87 In fact, City of Burbank and other subsequent
decisions discussed below illustrate that it is not inconceivable that a comprehensive analysis of the Federal Aviation Act could indicate significant
facets of aviation law—or even the entire field of aviation safety—are impliedly preempt.88
Returning briefly to the preemptive effect of the Aviation Act, the Supreme Court held that another narrowly defined area of aviation law was
preempted.89 In Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shcket,90 the Court decided that all
state laws allowing undocumented or unrecorded transfers of interest in
aircraft were preempted by the Aviation Act.91 Relying instead on conflict
preemption, because the FAA required that all transfers of title be in writing
and recorded with the FAA, any state law permitting undocumented or unrecorded transfers created “direct conflict” with the Aviation Act.92 Next,
the Supreme Court addressed the express preemption clause contained in
the ADA.93
In Morales v. Trans World Airlines Inc.,94 state attorneys general tried
to enforce state deceptive practices laws on airline advertising.95 In a six to
three decision, the Court held that state fare advertising guidelines were

85. Id. at 652 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 125 (3d Cir. 2010).
88. See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-276, 72 Stat. 731; City of
Burbank, 411 U.S. 624.
89. See Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shcket, 462 U.S. 406, 406 (1983).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 410.
92. Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1403. Section 503(a) of the Act states that
“[n]o conveyance or instrument the recording of which is provided for by [§ 503(a)(1)] shall
be valid in respect of such aircraft . . . against [third parties] until such conveyance or other
instrument is filed for recordation in the office of the Secretary of Transportation.” Id.
93. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified
as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1305 (1978)).
94. Morales v. Trans World Airline, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
95. Id. at 379.
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preempted by section 1305(a)(1) of the ADA96 because they related significantly to the prices, routes, and services; and thus, the guidelines were within the scope of the express preemption clause.97 After Morales, the Court
declined to extend the express preemption clause in a class action suit involving members of airline frequent flyer programs for breach of contract
under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.98
In American Airlines v. Wolens,99 the Court held that contracts made wholly
between the airline and passengers were normally not preempted, but a
plaintiff’s claim under any state Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act100 was expressly preempted by the ADA.101 Justice Ginsberg,
writing for the majority, reasoned that the airline’s frequent flyer program
was a “self-imposed undertaking[],” and Congress did not intend, by passing the ADA, for “[private] terms and conditions” to be similar to a state
enacted or enforced law.102 Thus, preemption occurs for all claims that have
“more than a tenuous connection to airline services . . . .”103 Decided by a
five to three vote, Wolens appeared to be a fractured decision.104 The lack of
agreement in Wolens under the ADA’s express preemption clause suggests
that if presented with the question of whether preemption occurs in the context of enforcing state standards for negligence and product liability claims,
the result would be a decidedly split opinion.105 Unfortunately for the lower
courts, the Supreme Court has never approached preemption outside of the
ADA or other tangential areas of the Aviation Act.106

96. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified
as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1305 (1978)).
97. Morales, 504 U.S. at 385-86.
98. Am. Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 226 (1995).
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practice Act, 815
ILL. COMP. STAT. 505 (1992) (original version at ch. 121 1/2 ILL.REV.STAT. ¶ 261 et seq.
(1991)).
101. Wolens, 513 U.S. at 228.
102. Id. at 228-29.
103. Matthew J. Kelly, Federal Preemption by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978:
How do State Tort Claims Fare?, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 873, 895 (2000).
104. See Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Justice Stevens believed there was no preemption for private tort actions. Id. at 236.
Justice Scalia did not participate in the decision. Id. at 235.
105. Id. at 234. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at 238
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (holding that none of the plaintiffs’
claims should be allowed to proceed).
106. See Smith, supra note 49, at 89.
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How Lower Courts Interpret Preemption in Aviation Law

Prior to Abdullah v. American Airlines and consistent with the Supreme Court, most decisions regarding common law claims prior to the
passage of the ADA involved discrete aspects of aviation law.107 For example, the Seventh Circuit in Kohr v. Allegheny Airline, Inc.108 found that the
Federal Rules of Contribution and Indemnity among joint tort-feasors
should control in aviation collisions, thus preempting state law rules of indemnity and contribution.109
With the passage of the ADA,110 there was sufficient controversy regarding whether preemption still applied because Congress retained the
original savings clause from the Aviation Act and added an express
preemption provision.111 Many courts have found that even though the Department of Transportation (DOT)—through the FAA—maintains heavy
involvement in aviation regulations, state standards are not preempted.112
As Congress intended with the passage of the ADA, privatizing the airline
industry created more airline companies, which increased the number of
flights, and inevitably increased the frequency of litigation revolving
around the intent of the Aviation Act, and thus preemption analysis among
the courts accelerated.113 Yet, as illustrated above, the decisions of the Supreme Court regarding aviation law have provided only a minor framework
in guiding lower courts in analyzing preemption.
3.

The History and Current State of Preemption Analysis

The addition of an express preemption clause in the ADA led courts to
inconsistent results when analyzing whether state law was subject to implied field or conflict preemption under the Aviation Act. The Supreme
Court itself has inconsistently scrutinized the intended effect of an express
preemption clause on a statutory scheme.114 In the 1992 decision, Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., the Supreme Court held that there was no implied
field preemption when it examined the scope of a cigarette warning statute
107. See, e.g., Kohr v. Allegheny Airline, Inc., 504 F.2d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 1974).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 404.
110. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. § 1301, § 1305(a)(1).
111. Id. § 105(a).
112. See, e.g., Pub. Health Trust of Dade Cnty. v. Lake Aircraft, Inc., 992 F.2d 291,
298 (11th Cir. 1993); In re Air Crash Disaster, 635 F.2d 67, 74-75 (2d Cir. 1980).
113. See Kelly, supra note 103, at 873.
114. Compare Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530-31 (1992), with
Grier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 872-73 (2000) (finding that an express
preemption clause precluded implied preemption, but later found implied preemption applicable in the context of an express preemption provision).
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containing an express preemption provision.115 The Court reasoned that
because Congress defined the preemptive reach of the statute through the
utilization of an express preemption provision, it implied that matters beyond that reach are not preempted.116 Indeed, this decision may have indicated to the lower courts that the existence of an express preemption clause
in the ADA and the original savings clause in the Aviation Act precluded
an implied preemption analysis—meaning state standards of care were applicable to product liability and negligence claims in the aviation context.117
Yet the Supreme Court backtracked from its previous holding two
years later, finding that the existence of an express preemption provision
did not automatically preclude a lack of preemptive intent outside the scope
of the express preemption provision.118 Rather, the Court found that implied
preemption may coexist with an express provision in some contexts.119 The
Supreme Court further backed away from its holding in Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc.,120 when it concluded that the presence of an express preemption provision and a savings clause in a statute does not, in and of itself,
foreclose an implied conflict preemption analysis.121 Indeed, Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.122 bolstered some lower courts to find conflict
preemption in aviation law when regulations promulgated by the FAA
make it impossible to comply with both federal and state law.123
115. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517.
116. Id.
117. See Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1443 (10th Cir. 1993),
abrogated by U.S. Airways, Inc. v. O’Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1326-27 (10th Cir. 2010);
O’Hern v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 1264, 1267 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
118. Freightliner v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288 (1995). Freightliner involved two
combined cases where plaintiffs sued for negligent design by two freight truck companies
because the trucks were not equipped with anti-lock brakes, which were not required under
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. 1391 (2006). Id. at
283. The Court ultimately found no preemption. Id. at 289.
119. Id. at 288. Justice Thomas stated: “The fact that an express definition of the preemptive reach of a statute . . . supports a reasonable inference-that Congress did not intend to
pre-empt other matters does not mean that the express clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption.” Id.
120. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 504 (1992).
121. Grier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000). The decision was
limited to implied conflict pre-emption. Id.
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., Sheesley v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. Civ. 02-4185-KES, 2006 WL.
1084103, at *19, *24-25 (D. S.D. April 20, 2006) (finding conflict preemption in state claim
based on defendant’s failure to provide additional emergency procedures in flight training
handbook when standards dictated what specific procedures could be in manual). Sheesley
represents a novel interpretation of the FAA. The court specifically held that it disagreed
with the broad field preemption ruling in Abdullah, but found that standards promulgated by
FAA had the potential to create conflict preemption if complying with state law became
impossible. Id.
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Wyeth v. Levine

Recently, the Supreme Court made arguably its most significant ruling
in the area of implied preemption. Wyeth v. Levine124 involved a claim
brought by a musician who developed gangrene and subsequently lost her
arm.125 Relying on common law negligence and strict liability theories,
plaintiff alleged that Wyeth had failed to instruct/warn of the danger of intravenously administering nausea medication called Phenergan with an IVpush.126 However, Phenergan’s labeling was approved by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) and contained a warning of the danger of gangrene and amputation.127 Before the Court, Wyeth argued that because the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) required the FDA to determine that
a drug is safe and effective under the conditions set forth in the drug labeling, the FDA presumed to have performed a precise balancing of risks and
benefits, establishing a specific labeling standard.128
In other words, they argued any state standard of care impliedly conflicted with the federal statutory scheme because changing the label would
inevitably lead to violating federal law.129 Again arguing that state law conflicted with the federal scheme, Wyeth gave the broader argument that a
state-law duty to provide stronger warnings “would obstruct the purposes
and objectives of federal drug labeling regulation.”130 In rejecting both arguments, the Court reasoned that the minimum federal labeling standards,
arguably very similar in formulation to the Code of Federal Regulations’
(CFR) minimum aircraft worthiness standards, were a “floor upon which
States could build . . . .”131 However, contrary to the regulations passed
pursuant to the Aviation Act, the Court relied on specific provisions which
allowed the company to enhance or strengthen the labeling on a drug if that
information was newly acquired.132 Further, the plaintiff was able to point
124. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 555 (2009).
125. Id. at 558.
126. Id. at 559.
127. Id. at 558.
128. Id. at 568.
129. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 568. It should be noted that Wyeth unsuccessfully argued in
front of the lower courts that the entire field of drug labeling was impliedly preempt. Id. at
559.
130. Id. at 573.
131. Id. at 577.
132. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (2006), and 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(b) (2008),
with 14 C.F.R. § 21.113 (2008) (stating that major alterations to an already type certified
aircraft must be accompanied by a Supplemental Type Certificate), and 14 C.F.R. § 43.3
(2008) (“[N]o person may maintain, rebuild, alter, or perform preventive maintenance on an
aircraft, airframe, aircraft engine, propeller, appliance, or component part to which this part
applies. Those items, the performance of which is a major alteration, a major repair, or preventive maintenance . . . .”). But see 14 C.F.R. § 43.3 (“A manufacturer may . . . [r]ebuild or
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to twenty instances where injuries resulted from the product subject to the
lawsuit.133 Contrary to the findings of most courts in aviation cases, the
Court noted that the FDA had never intended to preempt failure to warn
claims despite many opportunities to do so.134
Prior to Wyeth, there was always a “presumption against preemption”
when analyzing an express preemption provision,135 but the Court had never
explicitly applied the presumption in the context of implied conflict
preemption analysis.136 Taking the language used by the Court to its furthest conclusion, there appears to be a presumption against preemption anytime an implied preemption analysis is undertaken, even in areas that historically have been under federal control.137 This may raise the burden on the
defendant to prove that implied preemption applies. Still remaining however, is that much of the language from the Wyeth decision implies an acceptance of the Grier Court’s methodology, which placed greater emphasis
on the purposes and objectives of Congress as opposed to the degree and
length of federal control over the industry. Thus, the absence of an express
preemption provision is never dispositive in determining the preemptive
reach of a statute.138
Ultimately, the Court cited two major reasons that illustrated a lack of
preemptive intent by Congress. First, the existence of an express preemption
clause, which dealt with a different, but related aspect to drug regulation in
the context of medical devices illustrating that Congress did not wish to
preempt drug labeling.139 Second, Congress failed to add an express
preemption clause despite awareness of heavy state tort litigation.140 The
Court noted that even though congressional intent indicated that labels were
alter any aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, or appliance manufactured by him under a type
or production certificate”); G.S. Rasmussen & Associates, Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc.,
958 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1992).
133. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 569.
134. Compare id. (noting that the FDA relies on state law to maintain an extra layer
of consumer protection in addition to FDA regulation), with Witty v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,
366 F.3d 380, 385 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding failure to warn of risks of DVT not within Federal Regulations and thus preempted as a matter of law), and Greene v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Sys., Inc., 409 F.3d 784, 795 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding failure to warn claims not based on
federal standard preempted under implied field preemption).
135. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
136. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 567 n.3.
137. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Wyeth v. Levine and Agency Preemption: More Muddle, or
Creeping to Clarity?, 45 TULSA L. REV. 197, 221 (2009).
138. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 567 (Thomas, J., concurring). In contrast with the majority,
Justice Thomas stated: “[I]n assessing the boundaries of the federal law—i.e., the scope of
its pre-emptive effect—the Court should look to the federal statute itself, rather than speculate about Congress' unstated intentions.” Id. at 596 n.4.
139. Id. at 574.
140. Id.
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both a floor and ceiling, Congress never thought that state tort claims frustrated the purpose of the statute.141 The Court concluded that these two factors created “powerful evidence” that Congress did not intend to preempt
state law.142
5.

The Effect of Wyeth on the Aviation Context

Although Wyeth was decided under implied conflict preemption, arguably the decision relates to implied field preemption and indicates a major
shift in preemption analysis, which may have consequences in the aviation
context. However, noting that field preemption analysis focuses on the extent of control, whereas conflict preemption focuses on the overall objective
and purpose of the statute, and given the extensive control that the FDA
wields under the FDCA, it may be a non-issue. Still, the distinction may
limit the decisions effect even though the two judge created doctrines can
be conflated.
Arguably, the FDCA is very similar to the Federal Aviation Act in its
structure and scheme. Both involve a large statutory scheme that prescribes
a significant role to large agencies within the federal government that continue to assert an extensive role in their respective spheres.143 The FDA’s
regulation of warning labels is analogous to the DOT’s regulation of specific aircraft components known as type, production, and air worthiness certificates.144 Like the FDA’s minimum drug labeling standards, the FAA continually publishes regulations that prescribe a minimum specification on
manufacturing parts.145 Further, both statutory schemes contain an express
preemption clause dealing with a different component within the larger
governing statute, presenting ample opportunity for Congress to add an

141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301); Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-276, 72
Stat. 731.
144. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2010); 21 C.F.R. § 314.105 (2010); 14 C.F.R. § 91.7
(2010) (ensuring that pilots verify aircraft’s worthiness); 14 C.F.R. § 43.3 (2008) (“A manufacturer may . . . [r]ebuild or alter any aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, or appliance manufactured by him under a type or production certificate”). But see 14 C.F.R. § 21.113 (2008)
(stating that major alterations to an already type certified aircraft must be accompanied by a
Supplemental Type Certificate), and 14 C.F.R. § 43.3 (2008) (“[N]o person may maintain,
rebuild, alter, or perform preventive maintenance on an aircraft, airframe, aircraft engine,
propeller, appliance, or component part to which this part applies. Those items, the performance of which is a major alteration, a major repair, or preventive maintenance . . . .”).
145. Id.
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express preemption clause.146 Indeed, Wyeth v. Levine may have a profound
effect on the state of preemption in aviation law.
III. MOST OF THE FIELD OF AVIATION SAFETY IS IMPLIEDLY PREEMPTED
A.

ABDULLAH V. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.

When the plaintiffs in Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc. filed in the
District Court of the Virgin Islands, the Third Circuit and accompanying
district courts had never ruled on the issue of preemption in the aviation
context.147 In Abdullah, an American Airlines airplane—while en route to
New York from San Juan, Puerto Rico—encountered severe turbulence that
caused serious injuries to a number of passengers.148 The First Officer noticed the weather system developing within the flight path and illuminated
the seatbelt sign, but the pilot told only the flight attendants that there
would be turbulence.149 None of the crew alerted the passengers and the
pilot did not circumvent the storm.150 Plaintiffs suffered injuries ranging
from unconsciousness and subsequent injuries, to minor physical injuries.151
Plaintiffs claimed that the pilot and flight crew were negligent in failing to
take reasonable precaution to avoid turbulent conditions known to them,
and for failing to warn passengers so that plaintiffs could protect themselves.152
After the plaintiffs won at trial under a reasonable person standard of
care, American Airlines filed a motion for a new trial, asserting that the
FAA established the standards of care and the trial court’s use of state and
territorial standards was prejudicial.153 The district court granted the motion
and decided in favor of defendants, finding a strong similarity to the Third
Circuit’s previous holding in the area of nuclear safety as precedent for
preemption.154 The court specifically found that the objective of Congress
was to both promulgate and enforce safety regulations for airlines,155 that
146. See Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 521, 90 Stat. 539, 574 (1976) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360); General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103298, 108 Stat. 1552.
147. Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 364 n.1 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating
that claim was an open question).
148. Id. at 365.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Brief for Petitioners-Appellants at 4-5, Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d
363 (3d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-7055).
152. Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 365.
153. See Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 337, 337 (D.V.I. 1997).
154. Id. at 344.
155. Id. at 342.
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these regulations were perverse,156 and that the very nature of aviation law
required uniformity.157
On appeal, the Third Circuit agreed with the lower court and found
that state standards of care were preempted.158 Diverging from the lower
court’s decision however, the Third Circuit extended its holding beyond the
scope of the lower court’s ruling.159 Whereas the lower court argued that
state standards are preempted for pilots, passengers, and attendants while in
the “course of . . . a[] flight,”160 the Third Circuit held that the “entire field
of aviation safety” was preempted.161 Further, the court expounded on the
method that courts should use to find a governing federal standard of care
by looking at both the specific minimum standards and the general standard
of care promulgated under the Code of Federal Regulations.162 Since the
Third Circuit decision, defendants have cited Abdullah repeatedly in the
course of litigation.163
B.

ELASSAAD V. INDEPENDENCE AIR, INC.

Upon landing in Philadelphia, the flight attendant asked plaintiff to
wait until the other passengers left before disembarking the plane.164 Plaintiff was an amputee and used crutches to disembark, but did not ask for help
because he believed the only assistance would be for them to carry him
down, which he believed to be demeaning.165 As plaintiff descended the
stairs, he lost his balance and fell off the right side of the stairs, tearing cartilage in his shoulder that required surgical repair.166
156. Id. at 344-46.
157. Id. at 346.
158. Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 367 (3d Cir. 1999).
159. Id. at 365.
160. Abdullah, 969 F. Supp. at 341.
161. Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 365.
162. Id. at 371.
163. See, e.g., Martin v. Midwest Express Holdings, Inc., 555 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir.
2009); Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 504 F.3d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 2007); Witty v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 366 F.3d 380, 385 n.8 (5th Cir. 2004). District courts sitting in the Third Circuit
have also inconsistently applied Abdullah. See Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 731 F.
Supp. 2d 429, 439 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (finding all product liability, breach of warranty, and
negligence actions must be pled using federal standards); DuVall v. AVCO Corp., No. 4:CV
05-1786, 2006 WL 224020, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2006) (finding that plaintiffs need not
plead that defendants violated federal standard for products liability, negligence, and wrongful death action arising from plane crash) (overturned on motion to reconsider); Allen v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 2d 370, 377 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (finding that airline did not violate
C.F.R. § 91.13(a) (2010) when passenger ignored seatbelt sign to grab luggage and luggage
fell on plaintiff).
164. Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 119 (3d Cir. 2010).
165. Id.
166. Id.
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Plaintiff commenced the lawsuit against Independence Air and Delta
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, advancing three separate negligence claims under Pennsylvania law.167 Plaintiff claimed that defendants were negligent in operating an aircraft made
defective by design features of the aircraft steps, failing to inspect and
maintain the steps, and failing to offer and render assistance to him as he
disembarked.168 Defendants removed to federal court based on diversity of
citizenship.169 In June 2005, plaintiff dismissed Delta from the suit.170 The
remaining defendant, Independence Air, then moved for partial summary
judgment with respect to the first claim and the district court granted it unopposed.171 The plaintiff, likely sensing that precedent was not favorable,
also voluntarily dismissed the second claim based on Independence Air’s
failure to inspect and maintain the steps.172 Defendant moved for summary
judgment on the remaining claim of failing to render assistance as he disembarked the plane.173 The district court concluded that based on Abdullah,174 federal law dictated the standard of care for his negligence suit.175
Plaintiff then appealed and the Third Circuit granted review.176
Plaintiff claimed that because the FAA did not prescribe a minimum
standard of care for disembarking passengers, that state law standards of
care apply, or alternatively, assuming that the standard of care is the general
standard of care set forth in Code of Federal Regulation section 91.13(a):
“No person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to
endanger the life or property of another” that defendants were reckless in
not offering assistance to the plaintiff.177 Defendant argued that the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA) provided the standard of care, but even if it did
not, that plaintiff had failed to meet his burden of a “careless or reckless
manner” under Code of Federal Regulation section 91.13(a).178
Holding that the regulations pertaining to offering passengers assistance did not preempt plaintiffs claim, the court abrogated their previous
holding in Abdullah,179 stating that state standards of care are preempted

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
Id.
Elassaad, 613 F.3d at 122
Id. at 122-23.
Id. at 128.
Id.
Id.
Abdullah v. Am. Airlines Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 365 (3d Cir. 1999).
Elassaad, 613 F.3d at 128.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 129 (quoting 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2010)).
Id.
Abdullah v. Am. Airlines Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 365 (3d Cir. 1999).
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only when the plane is “operat[ed] for the purpose[s] of air navigation.”180
The Third Circuit focused heavily on the meaning of Code of Federal Regulation section 91.13(a), which provides: “Aircraft operations for the purpose
of air navigation. No person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless
manner so as to endanger the life or property of another.”181 Under the general definitions section of the Aviation Act, “[o]perate” is defined as “use,
cause to use or authorize to use aircraft, for the purpose (except as provided
in [section 91.13]) of air navigation including the piloting of aircraft, with
or without the right of legal control . . . .”182 The court then concluded that
the general definition of “operate” referred only to “operations for the purpose of air navigation,”183 thus making it part of the definition of operate
derived from Code of Federal Regulation section 91.13(a) and “the except
as provided in 91.13” applied to section 91.13(b), which meant that a careless and reckless standard did not apply unless the plane was operating or
manipulated for the purpose of operating.184 Then the court looked to other
parts of the Aviation Act to clarify the meaning of section 91.13(a).185
Armed with their definition of section 91.13(a), the court concluded that
section 91.13(b), which sets out the standard of care for when a plane is not
operated for the purpose of air navigation, was meant to limit the applicability of the rule to “those acts which impart some physical movement to
the aircraft, or involve the manipulation of the controls of the aircraft such
as starting or running an aircraft engine.”186 In other words, regulations
regarding pilots, flight attendants, and other personnel associated with the
aircraft when the plane is not in flight are preempted under either section
91.13(a) or (b).
The Third Circuit reasoned that because regulations adopted pursuant
to the Aviation Act are predominantly associated with flight,187 when a
plane is not “in flight” or engaged in any activity related to flight, there is
no federal standard.188 Meaning that the purpose of the act was safety, and
safety is only implicated when it concerns flight. Applying their reasoning
to the facts of the case, the court stated that the federal regulations published by the DOT are perverse, but do not regulate the conduct of a flight
180. Elassaad, 613 F.3d at 130.
181. 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2010).
182. Id. § 1.1.
183. Elassaad, 613 F.3d at 129 (citing 14 C.F.R. §§ 1.1, 91.13 (2010)).
184. Id. (citing 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2010)).
185. Id. at 129. The court concluded that “[a]lthough the statute does not define ‘air
navigation,’ it does define two related terms: ‘navigate aircraft’ and ‘air navigation facility.’
‘[N]avigate aircraft’ and ‘navigation of aircraft’ include piloting aircraft.” Id. (quoting 49
U.S.C. § 40102 (2008)).
186. Id. at 130.
187. Id.
188. See Elassaad, 613 F.3d at 130.

78

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 3

crew when a passenger disembarks.189 Therefore, because the flight crew
and pilot were not engaged in any act that “imparted . . . physical movement” under section 91.13(a) or “manipulat[ed] . . . the controls of the aircraft” under section 91.13(b), state standards of care applied.190
IV.

ANALYSIS

It is possible that the Third Circuit was influenced by the recent Supreme Court decision in Wyeth v. Levine,191 though it only mentioned the
decision in passing.192 The Third Circuit ultimately concluded that it was, in
the very least, overbroad in their holding of Abdullah.193 Though the Third
Circuit was clear in reconciling Ellassaad with Abdullah, there remains
doubt about the fullest extent of the Third Circuit’s language, “operated for
the purpose of air navigation.”194 Thus, the analysis section discusses the
problems with the phrase, “operated for the purpose of air navigation,”195 in
the context of run-of-the-mill negligence claims, and to the general question
of whether product liability claims, breach of warranty, or negligent design
claims should regularly be preempted. Then it discusses whether the Third
Circuit’s preemption analysis is reconcilable with other courts, other transportation statutory contexts with similar statutory schemes, and current
preemption analysis. The analysis section then gives competing arguments
relating to preemption and concludes that the scaled back approach employed by the Ninth Circuit, which focuses on the specificity and pervasiveness of the regulations, is the proper way to construe preemption in
aviation law, absent a ruling by the Supreme Court.
A.

ELASSAAD AND THE PROBLEMS WITH A DEFINITIONAL APPROACH

The Third Circuit failed to illustrate how future litigants should allege
violations in light of Elassaad. Under the Abdullah framework, plaintiffs
had to allege that the defendant was careless and reckless under the Code of
Federal Regulation section 91.13(a) and cite to a specific regulation that the

189. Id. at 130.
190. Elassaad, 613 F.3d at 130. The court also held that the Air Carrier Access Act,
49 U.S.C. § 41705 (1986), did not relate to safety, and thus did not set the standard of care.
Id.
191. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 567-69 (2009).
192. Elassaad, 613 F.3d at 131 n.7-8 (stating that because Abdullah did not apply to
the facts of the case, the effect of Wyeth on Abdullah was not at issue).
193. See Abdullah v. Am. Airlines Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 365 (3d Cir. 1999).
194. Elassaad, 613 F.3d at 130.
195. Id.
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defendant violated.196 Because the entire field of aviation safety was
preempted, even when there was no specific regulation on point, plaintiffs
could not proceed with their claim.197 Foreseeably, the Third Circuit would
now conduct future aviation preemption analysis differently, but only if the
plane is stationary or the pertinent regulation does not deal with operation
or navigation.198
Even if the framework for alleging a violation was clear, potential
problems arise through the Third Circuit’s definition centered approach.
The Third Circuit’s first definitional problem is its failure to delineate when
“operations” begin and end, or which activities are for the purposes of “operations.”199 Failing to delineate fully the contours of “operations” or “navigation” leaves a small, but significant gray area.200 In fact, the court was
explicit in stating that it “do[es] not reach the issue of whether other activities that occur while a plane is on the ground, such as taxiing or the process
of opening an aircraft’s doors, would constitute ‘operations’ such that they
would be subject to federal preemption.”201 Judging from the language employed by the Third Circuit, claims occurring when a plane is flying, landing, or taking off are almost always preempted, but taxiing and other forms
of disembarking are open questions, creating the second problem with this
approach.
The second problem that arises from the definition centered approach
of Elassaad is how inconsistently applied the language “operated for the
purpose of navigation” could potentially have on most common law
claims.202 Arguably, there would be some hypothetical negligence action
occurring while a plane is stopped that is not preempted, but a claim based
on the same facts is preempted while the plane is exerting independent
movement.203 Thus, the Third Circuit’s decision may cover many more
situations not envisioned by Congress in passing the Aviation Act, or may
create inconsistent results.

196.
2009).
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Bomanski v. U.S. Airways Grp., Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 725, 729-30 (E.D. Pa.
Id.
See Elassaad, 613 F.3d at 130.
See id. at 130. Note that the court did use some examples. Id.
Id.
Id. at 130 n.14.
See id. at 130.
Elassaad, 613 F.3d at 130.

80

1.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 3

The Ninth Circuit Versus the Third Circuit: Different Approaches to
Preemption

Most courts that address negligent failure to warn cases have come to
the conclusion they are usually preempted.204 The pervasiveness of regulations dealing with pre-flight and in-flight warnings indicates that the DOT
has exerted significant control.205 The conclusion by most courts that failure
to warn claims not based on federal standards makes sense, allowing states
to require further warnings to passengers would create havoc among airlines. Not only would every airline have to vocalize different warnings in
different states, but the prospect of further warnings would be especially
impractical considering that a flight can have unaccounted for problems or
more important warnings could be drowned out.206 Arguably, this should
even apply to airlines whose parts malfunction when they are not at fault.
However, the Elassaad decision raises many questions regarding other aspects of negligence, such as a failure to maintain safe conditions inside of
the airplane.207 By focusing on whether the context of the negligent action
requires the exertion of movement or control of the plane, the court missed
the point of preemption—stopping those affected by litigation from having
a duty that would be impracticable or inconsistent with congressional intent. Forcing a plaintiff, who is injured while on an airplane, to find both a
governing regulation, and prove that it was careless or reckless is extremely
difficult and fundamentally unfair when a plane or manufacturer is clearly
negligent. It obstructs the traditional role of state law in tort claims. The
Third Circuit believes this was the intent of Congress.208
A different approach is employed by the Ninth Circuit when analyzing
typical personal injury claims. In Martin v. Midwest Express Holdings
Inc.,209 the Ninth Circuit held that only when an agency issues “pervasive
regulations” in a particular area of flight safety, such as passenger warnings, are state standards preempted.210 Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning
seems to indicate an agreement with the Third Circuit, that when there are
pervasive or precise regulations, there is preemption, but does not agree
204. See, e.g., Greene v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Sys., Inc., 409 F.3d 784, 795 (6th
Cir. 2005) (finding failure to warn claims not based on federal standard preempted under
implied field preemption); Witty v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 366 F.3d 380, 385 (5th Cir. 2004)
(finding failure to warn of risks of DVT not within federal regulations and thus preempted as
a matter of law); Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 365 (3d Cir. 1999).
205. See 14 C.F.R. § 121.317 (2010).
206. Martin ex rel. Heckman v. Midwest Exp. Holdings, Inc., 555 F.3d 806, 810 (9th
Cir. 2009).
207. See Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
208. See id.
209. Martin, 555 F.3d 806.
210. Id. at 811.
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with how broadly to define the scope of pervasive regulations.211 While the
Third Circuit would classify most common law claims as preempted because a majority of time for passengers is spent while the plane is navigating,212 the Ninth Circuit’s analysis does not depend on the current state
of the aircraft, but the pervasiveness and preciseness of the regulations. 213
In fact, the negligent design claim in Martin would have been preempted if
it was brought in the Third Circuit, because the ladder at issue in that case
likely had an accompanying air worthiness certificate.214
2.

Moving Toward Cohesion: The Circuit Split

Currently, the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts follow the approach of the Ninth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit in Greene v. B.F. Goodrich
Avionics Systems, Inc.,215 found that the Aviation Act preempted failure to
warn claims but used state law analysis in determining whether a navigational instrument was defectively designed.216 The Fifth Circuit in Witty v.
Delta Airlines217 used the analysis of the Ninth Circuit by narrowly holding
that only specific aspects of aviation law are preempted, and failed to address the issue of whether a broader contextual or definition approach was
applicable.218
The claim-by-claim approach, however, does not have full-fledged
support. Recently, the Tenth Circuit abrogated their prior holding, which
was arguably more unfriendly to preemption than the Ninth Circuit.219 It
recently overturned Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Co., and implicitly adopted

211. Id. at 814.
212. See Elassaad, 613 F.3d at 130.
213. Martin, 555 F.3d at 810.
214. Id.
215. Greene v. B.F. Goodrich Avionics Sys., Inc., 409 F.3d 784, 788-89, 794-95 (6th
Cir. 2005).
216. Id. at 794-95 (agreeing with the central holding of Abdullah in finding that the
entire field of aviation safety was preempted, but did not conclude that Abdullah was applicable in its discussion about product liability).
217. Witty v. Delta Airlines, 366 F.3d 380, 381 (5th Cir. 2004).
218. Id. at 385. See, e.g., Monroe v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 417 F. Supp. 2d 824, 835
(E.D. Tex. 2006) (finding no preemption in field of Aviation safety).
219. Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1442 (10th Cir. 1993), abrogated by U.S. Airways, Inc. v. O’Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1326-27 (10th Cir. 2010). See
also Pub. Health Trust of Dade Cnty. v. Lake Aircraft, Inc., 992 F.2d 291, 295 (11th Cir.
1993) (finding lack of pertinent regulation and statutory command to indicate preemption). It
should be noted that in Public Health Trust, the Eleventh Circuit relied on old Supreme
Court precedent in determining proper preemption analysis. Id.
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the holding of Abdullah.220 Whether that includes the broader holding of
Abdullah, the modified ruling of Elassaad, or the approach undertaken by
the Ninth Circuit in Martin, remains to be seen.221
In sum, the Ninth Circuit’s preemption analysis allows airline companies to claim preemption in situations where the regulations are so perverse
and precise that deviations based on each state law would be impractical
and burdensome regardless of context.222 Further, a claim by claim approach allows plaintiffs injured on an airplane to only prove negligence, as
opposed to recklessness, if there are no applicable regulations or significantly broad regulations.223 A specific and pervasive regulation approach,
as opposed to a context or definition centered approach, will lead to more
uniform results amongst the courts.224
3.

Elassaad is Incorrect in Finding that whenever Plaintiff Implicates any
Air Worthiness Certificate or Type Worthiness Certificate, There is
Preemption

It would be difficult to argue with conviction that the decision in
Elassaad did not represent an explicit acceptance that product liability,
breach of warranty, or negligent design claims are always preempted because there are specific, minimum aircraft worthiness requirements that
regulate components of an airplane.225 The court stated in explicit terms that
“it is not surprising, then, that most of the regulations adopted pursuant to
the Aviation Act concern aspects of safety that are associated with flight.
For example, the regulations detail certification and ‘airworthiness’ requirements for aircraft parts.”226
Even if one could argue that the focus in Abdullah and Elassaad strictly dealt with the operations of an aircraft, and thus, air worthiness certificates were not implicated, the interpretation of “operations” suggests an
inclusion of product liability claims, because after all, each part of the plane
is built for the purpose of operations.227 Assuming that a slightly narrower

220. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. O’Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1327-28 (10th Cir. 2010)
(relying on specific federal standard relating to alcoholic beverages as evidence of preemption).
221. Id.
222. Martin ex rel. Heckman v. Midwest Exp. Holdings, Inc., 555 F.3d 806, 810 (9th
Cir. 2009).
223. Id.
224. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565-67 (2009).
225. Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 128 (3d Cir. 2010); see supra
notes 132, 144 and accompanying text.
226. Elassaad, 613 F.3d at 128.
227. See id. at 130.
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definition of “‘air safety’”228 includes minimum aircraft worthiness certificates, any claim of state product liability or negligent design would more
likely than not, be preempted.229 It is impossible to prove recklessness when
the FAA approves the malfunctioning part and the company did not deviate
from its design.
However, the Third Circuit may be mistaken in its conclusion that air
worthiness regulations preempt state product liability and negligent design
claims.230 First, the GARA and its statute of repose provision indicate that
Congress did not believe that federal law preempted claims that implicate
minimum air worthiness certificates.231 Indeed, the statute of repose would
be wholly unnecessary if claims not based on deviations from federal
standards were already preempted.232 Moreover, the GARA233 was passed
in response to significant depreciation in the general aviation manufacturing
industry for which “products liability lawsuits were blamed . . . .”234 As the
Ninth Circuit noted in Martin v. Midwest Express Holdings, Inc.,235 the
FAA requires airlines to maintain liability insurance; there would be no
need to carry insurance if an airline or manufacturer could claim preemption.236 If product liability claims or negligent design claims are always
preempted, it would leave plaintiffs with legitimate claims unable to receive
compensation unless the airline or manufacturer acted recklessly or deviated from federal regulations.
The process for approving aircraft worthiness or type certificates/standards may itself indicate a lack of preemptive intent. Minimum
standards are not conclusive of preemptive intent237 or a lack of preemptive
intent.238 As the Supreme Court explained, every plane is certified by the
FAA to meet certain minimum standards.239 However, this process is main228. Id. at 129.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 128.
231. See Monroe v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 417 F. Supp. 2d 824, 830 (E.D. Tex. 2006)
(stating that the adoption of the GARA implied a continued viability of state tort law
claims).
232. Id.
233. General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103- 298, 108 Stat.
1552.
234. Kelly, supra note 38, at 129. Accord McClune, supra note 12, at 725.
235. Martin ex rel. Heckman v. Midwest Exp. Holdings, Inc., 555 F.3d 806, 806 (9th
Cir. 2009).
236. Id. at 808 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 41112 (1994)). Airline must have insurance
“sufficient to pay . . . for bodily injury to, or death of, an individual or for loss of, or damage
to, property of others, resulting from the operation or maintenance of the aircraft . . . .” 49
U.S.C. § 41112 (1994).
237. Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 168 n.19 (1978).
238. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 147-48 (1963).
239. United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 800 n.1 (1984).
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ly done by the manufacturer and the certificates do not provide a completed
product.240 The FAA gives airplane manufacturers “broad responsibilities”
for assuring their own compliance by appointing aircraft company employees to “act as surrogates of the FAA in examining, inspecting, and testing
aircraft for purposes of certification.”241 The Tenth Circuit reiterated that
FAA approval was “not intended to be the last word on safety”242 and “by
its very nature, a minimum check on safety.”243 Other courts agree with this
sentiment: in Monroe v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,244 the Eastern District of Texas held that the certification process did not create a pervasive regulatory
scheme demonstrating preemption.245 It further stated that the regulations
that control design and safety are “broad and provide a non-exhaustive list
of minimum requirements leaving discretion to the manufacturer.”246
The question to be asked then is, how can a process which places such
a great emphasis on manufacturer compliance have preemptive effect? The
Third Circuit approach in Elassaad is overly broad in this regard because
there are some instances when claims that implicate air worthiness certificates or general regulations should be preempted and others where they
should not—merely because there is a general regulation requiring that a
plane is not operated carelessly or recklessly does not, in and of itself, preclude state standards.247 Like the Fifth Circuit stated in Witty v. Delta Airlines,248 after finding plaintiffs’ claims for failure to warn preempted: “[W]e
note our intent to decide this case narrowly by addressing the precise issues
before us . . . . We do not . . . express an opinion as to whether emergency
or unplanned situations on flights can form the basis of a state failure to
warn claim that is not preempted.”249 The federal courts have fashioned
different approaches to preemption in the aviation context, which have led
to different conclusions on nearly the same facts.250 This lack of cohesion
240. See id. at 800-08.
241. Id. at 807. The Court further stated: “[T]he duty to ensure that an aircraft conforms to FAA safety regulations lies with the manufacturer and operator, while the FAA
retains the responsibility for policing compliance . . . . [T]he FAA then reviews the data for
conformity purposes by conducting a ‘spot check’ of the manufacturer's work.” Id. at 81617.
242. Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1445 (10th Cir. 1993), abrogated by US Airways, Inc. v. O’Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1326-27 (10th Cir. 2010).
243. Id. at 1446.
244. Monroe v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 417 F. Supp. 2d 824, 830 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
245. Id. at 833.
246. Id.
247. See Witty v. Delta Airlines, 366 F.3d 380, 385 (5th Cir. 2004).
248. Id. at 380.
249. Id. at 385-86.
250. See generally Abdullah v. Am. Airlines Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 365 (3d Cir. 1999);
Lucia v. Teledyne Cont’l Motors, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1270 (S.D. Ala. 2001) (stating that
Congress or the FAA did not intend to fully occupy the field, such that no state remedies
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could be solved through a claim-by-claim approach. Without clear guidance
from the Supreme Court, most federal and state courts will continue to differ in great respects in their preemption methodology and conclusions in the
context of aviation.
B.

DOES ELASSAAD FIND SUPPORT FROM OTHER CONTEXTS?

1.

Maritime and Transportation Law

The statutes governing maritime law are thought to be “strikingly
similar” to the Federal Aviation Act.251 Therefore, the Supreme Court decisions dealing with the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA)252
may offer a foretelling of a decision by the Supreme Court, if they were to
grant certiorari on the issue of preemption in aviation law.
The Supreme Court first addressed preemption in maritime law in Ray
v. Atlantic Richfield Co.253 In Ray, due to a recent oil spill, Congress responded by enacting the PWSA.254 The Court addressed whether the PWSA
preempted attempts by states to require additional safety equipment.255 The
PWSA contained two pertinent provisions: Title I focused on traffic control
at local ports,256 whereas Title II focused on design and construction of oil
tankers.257 Using implied field preemption, the Court held that Title II had a
preemptive effect because “Title II leaves no room for the States to impose
different or stricter design requirements than those which Congress has
enacted with the hope of having them internationally adopted or has accepted as the result of international accord.”258 The Court further explained that
under Title II, the DOT had to determine the seaworthiness of all oil tankers
by certifying their compliance with federal law.259 Moreover, the PWSA
could apply in areas not affecting such rates, routes, or services); Monroe v. Cessna Aircraft
Co., 417 F. Supp. 2d 824, 835 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (finding no preemption in field of aviation
safety). Compare Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 475 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding
failure to warn of deep vein thembrosis is preempted, but leaving open question whether
unsafe seat configurations were preempted), with Martin v. Midwest Express Holdings, 555
F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no preemption in defective design of stairs and limiting preemption to areas of aviation where regulations are perverse).
251. Thomas J. McLaughlin, et al., Navigating the Nations Waterways and Airways:
Maritime Lessons for Federal Preemption of Airworthiness Standards, 23 AIR & SPACE L. 5,
9 (NO. 2, 2010).
252. Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1227.
253. Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 151 (1978).
254. 33 U.S.C. § 1221 (1972).
255. Ray, 435 U.S. at 155.
256. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1227 (1972).
257. McLaughlin, et al., supra note 251, at 8.
258. Ray, 435 U.S. at 168.
259. See id. at 166-69.
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implicated international interests and comity because the DOT had to accept valid certificates issued by sister sovereigns under various treaties.260
The Supreme Court more recently addressed the preemptive effect of
the PWSA in the decision United States v. Locke.261 Reconfirming Ray, the
Court held that some laws which the State of Washington had passed for
additional safety measures were preempted.262 The Court concluded that
Congress entrusted the DOT with exclusive power to determine which oil
tankers are sufficiently safe to navigate the waters of the United States.263
The Court noted that each title of the PWSA was entitled to a different
preemption analysis; Title I, which gave authority, but did not require the
Coast Guard to promulgate regulations, was entitled to conflict preemption
analysis, whereas Title II, where the promulgation of regulations is required, was entitled to field preemption analysis.264
It appears that the Third Circuit’s decision in Elassaad is consistent
with the Supreme Court’s line of cases in the context of the PWSA.265 This
conclusion makes sense, as both Acts designate federal regulation as minimum standards266 and create a comprehensive scheme. Some commentators
have argued that if the Supreme Court ever decided an aviation safety case,
it would find that the PWSA and Federal Boat Safety Act “have essentially
identical enabling statutes affirmatively requiring that a designated federal
agency establish all necessary standards to ensure the sea or airworthiness
of approved vessels or aircraft.”267 Further, the PWSA’s seaworthiness certification provisions and the FAA’s airworthiness or type certification provisions are similar because both are “mandatory . . . comprehensive . . . and
are designed to ensure . . . safe[ty].”268 Finally, like tankers under the
PWSA, the FAA is “generally required” to recognize airworthiness certificates issued by other countries.269
Yet, there are some flaws in automatically assuming that the PWSA
and Aviation Act are sufficiently similar to merit precedential value. Unlike
the Aviation Act, which contains an express preemption provision in the

260. Id. at 162.
261. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 89 (2000).
262. Id. at 116.
263. Id. at 110.
264. Id. at 110-11.
265. See Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
266. McLaughlin, et al., supra note 251, at 5.
267. Id. at 9. The first federal act regulating aviation, the Air Commerce Act of 1926,
was derived directly from the statutory framework governing marine vessels. Id.
268. Id. “Both are mandatory and comprehensive. Both laws also have certification
processes that flow from pervasive regulation and are designed to ensure that oil tankers and
aircraft can safely navigate the nation's waterways and airways, respectively.” Id.
269. Id. at 10.
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subsequent amendments, the PWSA contains no such provision.270 In fact,
the PWSA contains no preemptive language.271 The preemptive reach of the
PWSA is entirely judicially created, but the Aviation Act contains both an
express preemption provision under the ADA and GARA, with no other
express preemption provision.272 Further, the Supreme Court has only addressed the PWSA in the context of state passed substantive safety requirements on tankers, not in the context of run-of-the-mill negligence
claims based on centuries of workplace injury common law.273
The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 may also
provide an analogous statutory scheme that supports preemption.274 Like
the Aviation Act, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act contains both an express preemption clause and savings clause that classify its
regulations as minimum standards.275 However, there are also some problems with comparing the two acts. Unlike the Aviation Act, the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act’s express preemption provision states
the preemptive scope of the regulations.276 Further, the Supreme Court in
Grier only used implied conflict preemption as opposed to field preemption
because the preemptive reach of the statute was stated in the express
preemption clause.277 Thus, comparing minimum standards in the aviation
context to the transportation context would mean that states may impose
safety standards in addition to the FAR and states would only be precluded
from drafting conflicting regulations.278
Thus, the precedential value of either statutory scheme is suspect. Although it is not unforeseeable that the Supreme Court will use other contexts
to determine the preemptive reach of the FARs because there are some similarities between aviation and other transportation statutory schemes.

270. Kelly, supra note 38, at 139.
271. Id.
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. See Nat’l Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13811431 (1988).
275. Id.; see also Kelly, supra note 38, at 137-38.
276. Gills v. Ford Motor Co., 829 F. Supp. 894, 895 (W.D. Ky. 1993). “[N]o State . .
. shall have any authority to either establish or to continue in effect, with respect to any
motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any safety standard . . . which is not identical to the Federal standard.” Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d)).
277. Grier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 881-82 (2000).
278. Kelly, supra note 38, at 137-38. Whether state law would conflict with federal
law is another question entirely not addressed by courts or this author.
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COMPETING ARGUMENTS: IS ELASSAAD RECONCILABLE WITH WYETH V.
LEVINE AND PUBLIC POLICY?

The Third Circuit in Elassaad was unwilling to go into the affect that
Wyeth had on their decision.279 It was correct when it stated that the issue of
preemption was not before it because Abdullah only extended to “air safety” and exiting a stationary plane did not implicate it.280 Yet, Elassaad, despite keeping in place a very broad and undefined area still subject to
preemption, may not be misguided.
1.

Wyeth v. Levine Does Not Explicitly Overturn Preemption Rulings in
the Aviation Context and Thus a Scaled Back Approach Would Not Be
Modified by the Supreme Court

Key language from the Wyeth decision and the distinctions between
the Aviation Act281 and FDCA282 illustrate that although Wyeth may have
changed the landscape of preemption analysis, there are still significant
questions about its applicability to other contexts. It should not be assumed
that the broad preemption decision in Elassaad is inconsistent with Wyeth.
Wyeth was clear that the Supreme Court will not grant Chevron283 deference to the conclusions of a federal agency dealing with preemption
without a specific express preemption provision.284 However, the Court
does look to a particular agency’s opinion as to the affect that the “state
requirements” will have on the “purposes and objectives” of Congress when
the statute is ambiguous.285 The Court found unpersuasive that the FDA had
recently reversed a long-standing policy of the agency regarding preemption, and a lack of any discussion by the FDA as to how state tort law interfered with FDA drug labeling regulation during the previous decades.286
The Court was also influenced by recent scholarship that suggested the
FDA was either “unwilling[] or [unable] to protect doctors, patients, or the
279. Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 127 n.7 (3d Cir. 2010).
280. Id. at 127.
281. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-276, 72 Stat. 731 (1958).
282. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1938).
283. Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 16-18 (2011); see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984) (using a two part test, a court may give deference to the interpretation
that a particular agency has given to their organizing statute; before granting deference, the
statute must be ambiguous).
284. Id.
285. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 557 (2009); see also Metzger, supra note 283,
at 16-18.
286. See generally Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 557 (2009); Metzger, supra note
283. It can be presumed that the FDA failed to illustrate its interpretation was reasonable, the
second requirement of the Chevron deference test.
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public from unsafe drugs, poor labeling, or untrue marketing.”287 This
is significant in light of the fact that the FAA, unlike the FDA, has always
maintained that their role is exclusive in regulating aviation law.288 Therefore, a hypothetical amicus brief submitted by the FAA would demonstrate
that they have not reversed their opinion or policy as to their preemptive
reach.289 Thus, even though the FAA would not be given Chevron deference, arguably it would be much more persuasive than the FDA’s recently
changed role in drug labeling.
In Wyeth, the Supreme Court stated that the FDA was not the final
word on safety, meaning that the drug company could and should make
their labeling as comprehensive and safe as possible beyond the approval of
the FDA.290 However, defense manufacturers and airline companies can
argue that the FAA’s role within the DOT is different from the FDA because the FAA’s word is truly final.291 Even though the Supreme Court in
Wyeth rejected the argument that greater warning labels would drown out or
dilute other, more significant ones, the regulations in Title 14 are different
contextually.292 Federally mandated warnings in the aviation context are
stated orally to passengers, including demonstrations.293 Further, regulations in the aviation context must deal with international interests and unlike the medical drug labeling context, there is no doctor or pharmacist intermediary, unless you include the airline company.294 The idea that the
FAA is the final word on all things aviation is reflected by the Supreme
Court in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, where the Court found
that cities were preempted from imposing state laws regulating air traffic
noise due to the exclusive role of the federal government.295
Unlike medical labeling, which affects the health and welfare of citizens, a role usually reserved for the states, aviation arguably is only indi287. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, When Worlds Collide: The Supreme Court Confronts
Federal Agencies with Federalism in Wyeth v. Levine, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1289 (2010).
288. Geoffrey M. Hand, Comment, Should Juries Decide Aircraft Design: Cleveland
v. Piper Aircraft Corp. and Federal Preemption of State Tort Law, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 741,
786-87 (1995).
289. Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1438 (10th Cir. 1993). Piper
is significant because the “United States file[d] its first historic brief as amicus curiae” on
behalf of the manufacturer. Kelly, supra note 38, at 123.
290. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 560-72. The Court stated that “the very idea that the
FDA would bring an enforcement action against a manufacturer for strengthening a warning
pursuant to the CBE regulation is difficult to accept-neither Wyeth nor the United States has
identified a case in which the FDA has done so.” Id. at 572.
291. See Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, 181 F.3d 363, 369-70 (3d Cir. 1999).
292. Compare Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 576-79, with Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 369-70 (discussing the role of minimum air worthiness certificates).
293. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 91.107 (2011).
294. McLaughlin, et al., supra note 251, at 10.
295. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 650 (1973).
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rectly associated with the health and welfare of citizens and has always
been the prerogative of the government within our scheme of federalism. 296
Moreover, there are stiff penalties for manufacturers and airline companies
when they deviate from FAA regulations, for any reason.297 Thus, it is not a
stretch to assume that the Supreme Court would give greater deference to
the Federal Aviation Administration and could conclude that Federal Aviation Administration regulations preempt state tort law.
Finally, a district court within the Third Circuit recently addressed a
claim alleging negligent design post Elassaad and Wyeth. In Sikkelee v.
Precision Airmotive Corp.,298 the court stated that the analysis used in Abdullah, and reconfirmed in Elassaad, was consistent with the preemption
analysis undertaken by the Supreme Court in Wyeth.299 Thus, from the perspective of a lower court, the Elassaad decision was applicable postWyeth.300
2.

Public Policy and the Traditional Role of Tort Law Support a Finding
that Preemption Should Be Applicable to the Field of Aviation Law,
but Only in Some Situations

The FDCA and the Aviation Act are sufficiently similar to warrant a
comparison between the two.301 Proponents of non-preemption argue that
the Supreme Court is trending significantly toward anti-preemption.302 As
the similarities between the two statutes and flaws of the Elassaad decisions are already discussed throughout the paper, the remainder of the Note
deals with public policy concerns.303
Some claims should not be preempted for policy reasons. Even though
aviation has been exclusively regulated by the federal government, tort law
has historically been left to the states.304 State police powers include public
safety and general welfare, therefore the “[s]afety of the skies and general
welfare of the flying public is no different.”305 A significant principle be296. See McLaughlin, supra note 251, at 5.
297. Harro Ranter, FAA Proposes Civil Penalty Against American Airlines of
$24.2 million,
AVIATION
SAFETY
NETWORK
(Aug.
28,
2010),
http://aviationsafetynetwork.wordpress.com/tag/american-airlines/. Recently, the FAA issued a $24.2 million civil penalty against American Airlines for failing to check wiring
bundles required by an Airworthiness Directive. Id.
298. Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 731 F. Supp. 2d 429 (M.D. Pa. 2010).
299. Id. at 438-39.
300. Id.
301. See discussion supra Part III.B.4.
302. See Cabraser, supra note 287, at 1304.
303. See discussion supra Part III.B.4.
304. Kelly, supra note 38, at 122.
305. Id. at 122.
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hind tort law and product liability law is to place the burden of loss upon
those most deserving to bear it.306 It is argued that between equally blameless parties, equity favors placing the loss upon the party who placed the
product into the stream of commerce, such as manufacturers and airline
companies.307 Airline companies and manufacturers are more likely to carry
insurance, and are in a better position to inspect the product. Allowing full
preemption could potentially leave manufacturers, who largely self-certify
their components with oversight from the FAA, subject to fraud.308 Thus,
the scheme of federalism supports the applicability of common law claims
in some contexts, but not in others. Situations where a state is trying to impose additional safety measures where there already is pervasive and specific control by the federal government should be preempted. Where there is
not that degree of control present, there should not be preemption.
Next, many of the proponents of non-preemption in the aviation context point to recent congressional action in the realm of aviation law. When
Congress passed the GARA, they “turned down a proposal that would have
expressly removed aircraft design from state authority.”309 Instead the
GARA, like the ADA, only removed certain discrete aspects of the aviation
industry from state control.310 Congress’s consideration of an expansive
preemptive reach, and deciding against it, illustrates that the field of aviation safety is not already preempted.311
V.

CONCLUSION

The district court in Sikkelee was not however, adamant in their approval of the decision in Elassaad.312 The court stated in response to plaintiff’s argument:
[W]e find the logic therein alluring, and perceive the wisdom of the various decisions in other Circuits that have
failed to find preemption in circumstances similar to the
case at bar . . . [but] we must follow the state of the law as

306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
1944).
311.
312.
2010).

Id. at 139-40.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 122.
Kelly, supra note 38, at 129-30.
See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal.
Kelly, supra note 38, at 129-30.
Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 731 F. Supp. 2d 429, 438-39 (M.D. Pa.
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articulated by the Third Circuit. The legal principle of stare
decisis commands no less.313
Stare decisis aside, the uncertainty illustrated by the district court represents
the larger problem: there is no consensus among the courts about the effect
of the Federal Aviation Act or its subsequent amendments.314 Even though
the Supreme Court has changed course on preemption, the history of Supreme Court jurisprudence is mired in inconsistency among the justices and
subject to change as quickly as it begins to have any effect on lower
courts.315 Until the Supreme Court takes a case in the aviation context, the
scaled-back approach utilized by the Ninth Circuit is fairest to all parties.316
The decision in Elassaad likely will remain good law despite the
weakness in a definition centered approach.317 The effect that Wyeth has on
Elassaad or aviation law in general is inconclusive and highly subjective at
this point.318 The middle ground approach employed by the Ninth Circuit is
the fairest to the aviation industry and potential plaintiffs. Elassaad is a step
in that direction, but the flaws of a definitional and contextual approach are
endless.
Looking to the governing Code of Federal Regulations to determine if
air safety is truly implicated and whether a federal standard is applicable
will be the most equitable solution for all parties and will satisfy the competing ambitions of federalism. In the hypothetical discussed in the introduction, the Third Circuit would likely find that the claim is preempted
because that particular regulation is within the definition of air safety.319
313. Id.
314. See generally Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 365 (3d Cir. 1999)
(finding entire field of aviation safety is impliedly preempted); Lucia v. Teledyne Cont’l
Motors, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1270 (S.D. Ala. 2001) (stating that Congress or the FAA did
not intend to fully occupy the field, such that no state remedies could apply in areas not
affecting such rates, routes, or services); Monroe v. Cessna Aircraft Company, 417 F. Supp.
2d 824, 835 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (finding no preemption in field of Aviation safety); Compare
Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 475 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding failure to warn of
deep vein thembrosis is preempted, but leaving open question whether unsafe seat configurations were preempted), with Martin v. Midwest Express Holdings, 555 F.3d 806, 812 (9th
Cir. 2009) (finding no preemption in defective design of stairs and limiting preemption to
areas of aviation where regulations are perverse).
315. See Metzger, supra note 283, at 44.
316. Martin, 555 F.3d at 812.
317. See discussion supra Part IV.
318. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. O'Donnell, 627 F.3d 1318, 1326 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding
that recent Supreme Court decision calls into doubt their previous decision in Cleveland v.
Piper Aircraft Co.). Ironically, the circuit that bucked the trend among other courts and
arguably went further than the rest of the circuits and Supreme Court precedent decides to
question their decision as soon as the Supreme Court gave implicit support for their prior
decision. See generally Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 569-70 (2009).
319. See Elassaad v. Independence Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 128 (3d Cir. 2010).
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Even though the plane landed and therefore is not in operation, it would still
be preempted because the part of the plane that malfunctioned is covered in
an air worthiness certificate. Merely because there is a regulation governing
the malfunctioning aircraft component does not mean that a plaintiff should
not be allowed to recover damages for the airline’s negligence. The scaledback approach allows the FAA to promulgate specific and numerous regulations in areas that should be exclusively under their control. It further
allows manufacturers to push for greater regulation, which would make
flying safer, but also allow plaintiffs to use product liability and negligence
claims in situations where the regulations are not precise or pervasive.
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